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It is a favorite practice of certain law school professors - especially
those teaching first year students - to conclude a discussion of difficult
cases or conflicting authority with the question: "Well, then, who's right ?"
Predictably, the student response is equivocating; thus, the professor will
suggest: "Shall we take a vote ?" In this way, the issues are resolved by a
quantitative, rather than qualitative approach. While this quantitative
approach is unsatisfactory to the student of law, it unfortunately often
manifests itself in judicial opinions under the guise of the "weight of
authority," thus enabling the judge to dispose handily of complex issues.
This is not to suggest that the issues have been resolved.
The manner in which some courts have approached the issue of
automobile crashworthiness, or the doctrine of the second accident, is
illustrative. There has been substantial controversy for many years over
the extent of a car manufacturer's duty to provide a "crashworthy"
vehicle, one that does not unnecessarily injure its occupants when in-
volved in a collision. In 1966, the Seventh Circuit decided Evans v.
General Motors Corporation,' in which the court held that the manufac-
turer was under a duty to design a car reasonably fit for its intended uses,
but that collisions were outside such uses.2 In 1968, the Eighth Circuit
decided Larsen v. General Motors Corporation,3 in which the court held
that the manufacturer, in designing its cars, had to take into considera-
tion the environment of the car's use, which included collisions. Thus, the
manufacturer might be liable for injuries caused by the car's design, even
though the design did not cause the collision in the first instance, if an
alternative, safer design was reasonable. 4
Since Larsen was decided, courts have had to choose between Evans
and Larsen5 in situations where the plaintiff charged the manufacturer
1. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
2. 359 F.2d at 825.
3. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
4. Id. at 502-03.
5. To illustrate the confusion generated by Evans and Larsen, in Bremier v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972), Judge Green concluded
that Maryland would adopt the crashworthy rule set forth in Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). Notwithstanding this prediction, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals later expressly rejected Larsen in Frericks v.
(72)
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with negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty regarding the car's
design. This comment updates the controversy generated by these cases,
both among the courts and the commentators; analyzes the manufacturer's
liability under negligence, strict liability and warranty; and suggests in-
herent weaknesses in the Evans approach.
II. CRASHWORTHINESS: A PLAY IN THREE ACTS
The term "crashworthiness" refers to the ability of the vehicle to
protect the passengers from exacerbated injuries following a collision.
Crashworthiness has also been defined as "the protection that a passenger
motor vehicle affords its passengers against personal injury or death as a
result of a motor vehicle accident." 6 The focus is upon the events follow-
ing the initial accident and includes both the collision of the passenger with
the interior part of the vehicle (the second accident) and the structural
integrity of the vehicle upon impact. 7 The driver-consumer-passenger's
suit against the manufacturer is "not grounded upon the theory that a
defect in the car caused the primary impact, but rather that the injuries
sustained were exacerbated by a defect in design." The following episodic
illustrations present the crashworthiness issue.
Act I, the sale: Involved here are the manufacturer, the retailer-dealer,
and the consumer who ordinarily possesses only limited knowledge of
General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 317 A.2d 494 (1974), vacated, 274 Md. 288,
336 A.2d 118 (1975), and adopted the crashworthy doctrine set forth in Evans v.
General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), 20
Md. App. at 528, 317 A.2d at 499. However, 3 months after Frericks had been
decided, the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected Evans in favor of Larsen, in
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 214-15, 321 A.2d 737, 744
(1974). Although New York appeared to be firmly in the Evans camp, based on
Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) .(which was the basis of the
Evans decision) and Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53, motion
for leave to appeal denied, 29 N.Y.2d 483, 274 N.E.2d 312, 324 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1971),
the New York Court of Appeals rejected Evans and Edgar and embraced Larsen
in Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
In Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"? 22 Bus. LAW.
589, 599 n.38 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Rheingold, Expectations], the author con-
cluded that Dean Wade was in apparent agreement with the Evans rationale, whereas
Evans was later rejected and Larsen's crashworthy doctrine embraced as "clearly
correct" in Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 848 (1973). The Evans and Larsen lines of authority are set forth in
Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972).
6. The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, § 2 (14), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1901 (14) (Supp. III, 1973). See also the definitions collected in Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974).
7. It may, however, be misleading to define crashworthiness in terms of the
impact of the car's occupants with the interior of the vehicle (the "second accident")
since not all design defects require a second collision to exacerbate injuries. Sklaw,
"Second Collision" Liability: The Need for Uniformity, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 499,
507 n.40 (1973). Indeed, in Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974), a Texas court recounted the parameters of "crashworthiness" set
forth at a pretrial hearing: the structural integrity of the-car's shell; the elimination
of sharp or protruding objects in the interior; passenger restraint devices; and the
elimination of fire following a crash. Id. at 499.
8. Sklaw, supra note 7, at 507.
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automotive engineering. Consumer A decides upon a sports car - a
Corvette; it is obvious to A that, notwithstanding other design features,
the car will not afford him the same degree of protection he might have in,
for example, a Cadillac. Consumer B decides upon a Volkswagen bus,
which maximizes interior storage space by placement of the engine in the
rear. It is apparent to B that passengers in the front seat are separated
from external hazards by a windshield and metal panel fronted with a
bumper and nothing more. Consumer C decides upon a hardtop passenger
car, which is attractive because there is no center post between the win-
dows, as in a sedan. Consumer D decides upon a car without a padded
dashboard since a padded dashboard is optional and therefore more ex-
pensive. Consumer E selects a General Motors' car over that of another
manufacturer; the General Motors car has an "X" frame, as opposed to a
perimeter frame. E is not aware of the construction of the frame, but
such knowledge would not cause E to consider alternative models. In
each sale, the dealer does not delineate the relative hazards of each model
in the event of head-on, rearend, broadside, or rollover collisions; nor
does the manufacturer set forth any warnings concerning the car's per-
formance upon such collisions at the time of purchase, and the consumers
naturally do not contemplate the destruction of their new possessions.
Act I, the accident: Consumer A, the Corvette purchaser, is driving
on the freeway when he is bumped from behind; the car explodes and A
is severely burned. B loses control of his bus, which strikes a telephone
pole head-on; B and a passenger in the front seat are severely injured.
C is also involved in an accident, and his hardtop car overturns; the roof,
lacking structural support, crushes C. D's car is involved in an accident
and the passengers are grievously injured when they strike the unpadded
dashboard. E's car is struck broadside; because of the "X" frame, there
is no steel beam on the side to protect E from the other vehicle upon im-
pact, and E is seriously injured.
Act 1iI, the litigation: In each of these situations, the issue is whether
the user-consumer-passenger has a cause of action against the manu-
facturer and retailer upon the grounds that the vehicle might have been
better designed so as. to minimize the injuries to the person following the
initial impact. Consumer A contends that the sports car could have been
designed so as not to explode when hit from the rear; B, that the bus
should have had more frontal protection; C, that the roof of the car might
have been strengthened to support the weight of the vehicle upon over-
turning; D, that a padded dashboard would have minimized his injuries;
E, that a perimeter frame would have afforded him greater protection in
the event of a broadside collision. Depending upon the wholly fortuitous
circumstances of the jurisdiction in which suit is brought, A, B, C, D, and E
may or may not have causes of action against the manufacturer. This
fortuity is a function of the conflicting lines of authority generated by the
Evans and Larsen decisions.
[VOL. 21
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS
LIABILITY
A. Background
Despite their contrary conclusions, both Larsen and Evans share a
common ancestor in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,9 Judge Cardozo's
landmark opinion defining the automobile manufacturer's liability for
personal injuries sustained by the consumer when a vehicle is proven
defective. In that case, although the car manufacturer had purchased
wheels for its cars from a reputable wheel manufacturer, one of the wheels
on plaintiff's car was defective. While plaintiff was driving, the wheel
collapsed and plaintiff was injured. Had the car manufacturer inspected
the wheels before assembly, the defect would have been discovered. 10
While the manufacturer insisted it had a duty of care only to the immediate
purchaser (the dealer), Judge Cardozo ruled that the manufacturer's duty
extended to the remote purchaser, notwithstanding the lack of privity,
when the product would be dangerous if negligently made." Dean Prosser
has observed that the opinion's
reasoning and its fundamental philosophy were clearly that the manu-
facturer, by placing the car upon the market, assumed a responsibility
to the consumer resting not upon the contract but upon the relation
arising from his purchase, together with the foreseeability of harm if
proper care were not used.12
Indeed, it has been asserted that the significance of the MacPherson opinion
lies in its "[focusing] attention upon the risk of harm and not upon the
manner by which it is caused or the number of events intervening between
the defendant's act and the catastrophe."'u
While MacPherson was generally accepted when the plaintiff alleged
injury arising out of an accident caused by a defect in the car's construc-
tion, the courts "long seemed reluctant to impose liability on the manu-
facturer" when the plaintiff alleged a defect in design as the cause of his
injuries.14 This reluctance to impose liability for faulty design appeared
9. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10. Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051.
11. Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
12. W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 643 (4th ed. 1971).
13. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REv. 372,
381 (1939). The implications of the MacPherson decision in the area of "crash-
worthiness" are discussed in Note, Manufacturer's Liability for an "Uncrashworthy"
Automobile, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 444, 446-47 (1967).
14. Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 HARV. L. Rzv. 863 (1956) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Katz,
Liability]. See Amason v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1935) ; Ford Motor
Co. v. Wolber, 32 F2d 18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 565 (1929) ; Davlin v.
Henry Ford & Son, Inc., 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927); Reusch v. Ford Motor Co.,
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even when the plaintiff's theory of recovery was breach of warranty."5
In an early case, one court facilely disposed of the plaintiff's allegation of
negligent design of the brake system by remarking that such allegation
only amounted to "a conclusion of the pleader that he knows more about
the construction of an automobile than the manufacturer.' 6 It has been
suggested that the hesitance of courts to impose liability for design defects
results from judicial distrust of a jury's competence to pass upon the
adequacy of a manufacturer's design choice.'
7
15. See Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937); Murphy
v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash. 2d 180, 100 P.2d 30,(1940).
16. Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 17 F. Supp. 615, 618 (W.D. Okla. 1936).
In Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951), plaintiff acci-
dentally overturned a vaporizer and was scalded when hot water escaped from a loose-
fitting top. In holding for the defendant, the court observed that the vaporizer was
in the condition the manufacturer intended it to be, that the purchaser was aware
of the product's features, and therefore the vaporizer was neither negligently made
nor the proximate cause of the injuries. Id. at 562, 107 N.E.2d at 411. The thrust
of cases such as Dillingham and Blissenbach seems to be that the manufacturer is in
a better position to know about its product design than the layman; if the manu-
facturer decides to market the product according to a certain design, that design is
not defective. Other courts, however, have not hesitated to hold a manufacturer
liable for an unsafe product design which causes injury. See LaGorga v. Kroger Co.,
275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969) ;
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963); McCormick v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
17. However, the assertion that juries are not appropriate arbiters of the design
decisions made by engineering experts "defies traditional legal theory." Comment,
Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and its Aftermath, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 299, 304 (1969) ; see Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial
Process, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 645, 663 (1967), wherein the authors asserted that judges
and juries routinely pass judgment upon the standard of care exercised by experts
in making decisions in areas other than products design.
As to the factfinder's capacity to pass upon the reasonableness of a defendant's
conduct with and without the assistance of expert testimony, see James & Sigerson,
Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REv. 697,
698-703 (1952).
Professor Henderson, on the other hand, has argued that, at least in the area
of conscious design choices, i.e., where the manufacturer, fully conscious of the risks,
adopts the design because the supposed benefits of the design outweigh the risks, it is
generally beyond a judge's and jury's capacity to pass upon the reasonableness of
the choice, given the "polycentric" nature of the inquiry. Henderson, Judicial Review
of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1531, 1558 (1973). He was especially worried about "judicial coin-flipping"
and "decision-by-whim" on the part of the jury. Id. at 1570.
Judicial reluctance to impose liability for design defects has also resulted from
the belief that, "whereas defects in construction or assembly of a product arise from
failure to follow established production procedures, defects in design evolve from
creative error and are much more nebulous and difficult to prove." Note, supra note
13, at 447. Another writer has observed:
The application of negligence principles to designs gave the courts pause. They
seemed puzzled by the fact that something perfectly executed according to a defec-
tive design could be thought of as negligently made. They tended to defer to
the expertise behind the technology in the case of design; they hesitated to in-
tervene because of the vast number of items that at one fell swoop might be held
negligently made should they impeach a particular design. And possibly they
[VOL. 21
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More recently, however, courts have found automobile manufacturers
liable in negligence for design defects that cause an accident and conse-
quent injuries.18 In Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirtdn Bus Co., 9 for
example, a petcock, used to drain the air chamber of a brake system, was
located close to the ground on the underside of a bus. The bus crashed
when its brakes failed, and the evidence suggested that the brakes failed
because debris on the highway had broken the petcock.20 The Carpini
court permitted the jury to determine whether the design created an un-
reasonable risk, even though General Motors demonstrated that, despite
the millions of miles vehicles of that sort had traveled on highways, no
accident of the type involved in Carpini had previously been reported. 21
From cases such as Carpini and the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
sections 39522 and 398,23 it is apparent that the manufacturer is under a
duty to use reasonable care in the design of a vehicle. If the design creates
an unreasonable risk of harm during its intended, normal or foreseeable
use, the manufacturer is liable for the injuries proximately caused by the
defective design. While this proposition suggests an uncomplicated formula
for determining a manufacturer's liability for uncrashworthy cars, the
extent of the manufacturer's duty, the intended use of the product, and the
reasonableness of the risk created are the very issues which compose the
Evans-Larsen controversy.
were troubled by the retroactivity in waiting until the items were made before
declaring there was a flaw in design.
Kalven, Negligence on the Move, 33 A.T.L.A.L.J. 1, 31 (1970). See also Noel,
Manufacturers' Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE
L.J. 816 (1962). For a discussion of the distinction between manufacturing defects
and design defects, see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.11, at 1557
(1956) ; Henderson, supra at 1547. See also Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability
for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 81, 84 (1973).
18. See Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 228 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Carpini v.
Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Comstock v. General
Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959). See also Noel, Recent Trends
in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43
(1965) ; Noel, supra note 17.
19. 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954).
20. Id. at 406.
21. Id. at 407.
22. Section 395 provides:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a
chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an un-
reasonable risk of causing physical harm to those who use it for a purpose for
which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those whom he
should expect to be endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for
which it is supplied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
23. Section 398 provides:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dan-
gerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others
whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable
use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the
adoption of a safe plan or design.
Id. § 398.
6
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B. The Rule of Evans
In Evans v. General Motors Corp.,24 plaintiff, the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent-consumer, alleged negligence, breach of implied
warranty, and strict liability as the bases for recovery against the manu-
facturer. 25 The consumer was killed when his Chevrolet station wagon
was struck broadside by another car. Since the car was designed with an
"X" frame, rather than a perimeter frame used in some other models, the
sides of the car provided less protection for its occupants in the event of a
side-impact collision. Plaintiff contended that the omission of side frame
rails created an unreasonable risk of harm to occupants in light of the
foreseeability of side-impact collisions and that, since the condition of the
vehicle was the-proximate cause of the decedent's injuries, the manufac-
turer was liable in negligence for its design of the car.20 Moreover, the
plaintiff argued that the manufacturer was strictly liable since the product,
not having side rails, was in a defective condition and was neither of
merchantable quality, nor reasonably fit for its intended use as an auto-
mobile.27 The federal district court dismissed the complaint, concluding
that each count failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.2 8
The Seventh Circuit affirmed 29 in an engagingly simple opinion. First,
the court recognized that the central issue was the extent of the manufac-
turer's duty to users of its product, stating: first, the manufacturer had
a duty to design an automobile reasonably fit for its intended use and free
from hidden, dangerous defects ;3o second, the design of the car without
side frame rails did not cause the collision; third, the manufacturer was
not under a duty to make its automobile accident-proof or foolproof, "nor
must he render the vehicle 'more' safe where the danger to be avoided
is obvious to all"3 1 and it was for the legislature to require manufacturers
to construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide;52 fourth,
cases such as MacPherson and Carpini were not applicable here because
in those cases the defect, whether in construction or design, caused the
24. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
25. 359 F.2d at 823.
26. Id. at 824.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 825.
30. Id. at 824.
31. Id., citing Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). In Campo,
plaintiff's hands were mangled in the revolving steel rollers of an onion-topping
machine. Plaintiff argued that the defendant negligently designed the machine by
failing to equip it with a safeguard or stopping device. Id. at 471, 95 N.E2d at 803.
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim because the dangerous condition of the machine
without safeguards was patent; unless the danger was latent, plaintiff could not
recover. Id. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804. If a duty to make safer, accident-proof or
foolproof machines was to be imposed on the manufacturer, it was for the legislature
to impose the duty. Id. at 475, 95 N.E.2d at 805. However, in Evans, it could not have
been seriously argued that the dangers attending the "X" frame design were patent.
32. 359 F.2d at 824.
[VOL. 21
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accident in the first instance ;33 and finally fifth, the intended purpose of
an automobile did not include collisions even though collisions were fore-
seeable. s4 Thus, the court concluded that the manufacturer had satisfied
its duty to make the product reasonably fit for its intended use.35
Evans elicited much scholarly criticism, 6 but was widely accepted by
the judiciary. In Shumard v. General Motors Corp.,37 for example,
plaintiff's decedent was killed in a Corvair which exploded upon impact
with another vehicle. The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
held that the manufacturer had no duty either to design fireproof cars or
to prevent injury to occupants when such cars collide with other objects.38
Observing that an automobile is not manufactured for the purpose of strik-
ing or being struck by other vehicles or objects, the court posited that
"the duty of an automobile manufacturer does not include the duty to
design and construct an automobile which will insure the occupants against
injury no matter how it may be misused or bludgeoned by outside forces." 9
In Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp.,40 the plaintiff's Valiant was
struck from behind. Due to insufficient fastening with screws, the seat
assembly collapsed upon impact; moreover, the seat assembly sustained
more impact because the bumper was allegedly weak. Plaintiff argued that
his serious injuries resulted from these unsafe design features. 41 However,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi not only adopted the Evans line of cases
as representing the weight of authority, but expanded the Evans rationale.
The court stated that the automobile manufacturer was not liable for in-
juries exacerbated by the car's design, even if the court concluded that the
design was "defective." 42 Unless the defective design caused the initial
accident or emergency, the plaintiff had no cause of action.43 Further-
more, the court ruled that, even under strict liability, it was not sufficient
33. Id. at 825.
34. Id.
35. Id. Judge Kiley wrote a forceful dissent. He reasoned that the manufac-
turer's duty extended to the environment of the product's use, and that accidents
were foreseeable; hence a manufacturer had to exercise reasonable care to minimize
collision-related injury. Id. at 827 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
36. See Kalven, supra note 17; Nader & Page, supra note 17; Noel, Manufac-
turers' Liability for Negligence, 33 TENN. L. REV. 444 (1966) ; Sklaw, supra note 7;
Note, Liability for Negligent Automobile Design, 52 IOWA L. REv. 953 (1967);
Comment, Products Liability - Duty of Care in Automobile Design - Fitness For
Collision, 21 S. CAR. L. REV. 451 (1969) ; Comment, supra note 17; 35 A.T.L.A.L.J.
116 (1974) ; 80 HARV. L. Rxv. 688 (1967); 4 HouSTON L. REv. 311 (1966) ; 42 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 111 (1966); 1966 UTAH L. REv. 698; 24 VAND. L. REv. 862 (1971);
Keeton, Book Review, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 594 (1967).
37. 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
38. Id. at 312 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 314.
40. 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
41. Id. at 570.
42. Recall that the Evans court concluded that although the automotive design
was a cause of the exacerbated injuries to the plaintiff, it was nevertheless fit for its
intended use, and thus not defective. 359 F.2d at 825. The Walton court concedes a
defective design throughout the.opinion. 229 So. 2d at 572-73.
43. 229 So. 2d at 572.
COMMENT
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for the plaintiff to show a defect and injury since "there must be some duty
owed to the plaintiff with regard to the defect, growing out of the intended
normal use for which the product was manufactured. '44 Finally, the court
voiced its concern about the ramifications of imposing the duty urged by
the plaintiff :
The adoption of the legal theory propounded by the plaintiff
would require this Court to establish by judicial order a new duty
not contemplated by common law and not sanctioned by case history.
What standards of duty or reasonableness of design would we re-
quire, and how could the judiciary police the industry? These ques-
tions are unanswerable. The courts have no machinery to inspect and
police industry so as to require compliance with detailed design
of products.
45
Similarly, the District Court for the Southern District of West Vir-
ginia was confronted with the crashworthy issue in McClung v. Ford
Motor Co.46 In that case, the plaintiff-driver alleged that his Mustang
was defectively designed in that it was not equipped with shoulder har-
nesses, seatlocks, and a collapsible steering wheel and steering column,
and that these defects exacerbated his injuries upon impact with another
vehicle. In a brief opinion, the court determined that the weight of
authority was contrary to the theory presented by the plaintiff.47 Further,
as was done in Walton, the court pointed to its incompetence to pass upon
design standards, asserting that requirements for automobile design were
a legislative function.4"
44. Id. at 573. See note 139 infra.
45. 229 So. 2d at 573. The following year in Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233
So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970), the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed its adherence to the
Walton standard, stating: "If every state decided what part of an automobile was
negligently designed, the manufacturers might be required to have fifty different
models of its cars - one for each state. This, of course, would be ridiculous." Id.
at 799. Recently, the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, in a
diversity action, was compelled to apply the Walton-Simpson rule. Williams v.
Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1974). In that case, plaintiff's
decedent was killed in an airplane crash. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that when
the aircraft crashed, the seat and restraining harness failed, thus contributing to
decedent's death. Id. at 605. While noting that Walton and Simpson have been
severely criticized, see Maraist & Barksdale, Mississippi Products Liability - A
Critical Analysis, 43 Miss. L.J. 139, 180 n.200 (1972), and that a distinguished scholar
has rejected the Evans rationale, see Wade, supra note 1, at 847-48, the court never-
theless had no choice but to apply existing Mississippi precedent. Thus, Cessna was
entitled to partial judgment on the pleadings as to liability for the failure of the
seat and harness. 376 F. Supp. at 606-08.
46. 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W.Va. 1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
47. 333 F. Supp. at 20.
48. Id. However, the court did suggest in dicta that a manufacturer would be
liable for a design which causes injuries, if the design were "at variance with, or
contrary to, the accepted body of scientific knowledge possessed by the average
mechanical or structural engineering personnel in the profession having to do with
the manufacture of subject vehicle." Id. at 21. Given the variant design, if injury
could reasonably be expected "in the course of normal and accepted use of the product
so designed, and in anticipation of the violence of collisions that can normally be
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The basis of the Evans line of cases, therefore, is a belief that the
imposition of a duty on car manufacturers to design crashworthy vehicles
is a legislative function and thus beyond a court's competence. Indeed, two
critics of the crashworthy doctrine have concluded:
It is evident, therefore, that the complex questions of injury-minimiza-
tion in automobile accidents are properly a function of legislative
and administrative action. The invitation to a jury to decide questions
of design not involved in collision causation is an invitation to sub-
stitute for a balancing of the social and economic questions involved in
such design not only the hindsight and inconsistency which would be
present in a case by case approach but also sympathy and speculation.
49
C. The Rule of Larsen
Conversely, in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,50 the Eighth Circuit
did not hesitate to impose a duty upon the manufacturer to design auto-
mobiles which would be reasonably safe in the event of a collision. In
Larsen, the plaintiff, while driving a Corvair, was involved in a head-on
collision with another vehicle which thrust the steering mechanism of
plaintiff's car rearward into the plaintiff's head, causing severe injuries.5 '
Plaintiff argued that the manufacturer was negligent in its design of the
steering assembly, in that the driver was exposed to an unreasonable risk
of injury from the rearward displacement of the steering shaft upon a left-
of-center, head-on collision.52 The plaintiff also contended that the manu-
facturer had been negligent in failing to warn purchasers of the allegedly
dangerous design, and that the manufacturer had breached implied and
express warranties.53 The federal district court rendered summary judg-
ment in favor of the manufacturer, 54 but the Eighth Circuit reversed.",
As in Walton, the court assumed the veracity of the plaintiff's allegation
of a defective design because summary judgment had been granted for
defendant.56 As did the Evans court, the Eighth Circuit defined the issue
in terms of the scope of the manufacturer's duty in the design of its auto-
mobiles, and reached the same conclusion as Evans, that the manufacturer's
duty of design and construction extends to producing a product reasonably
expected to occur at times," then the manufacturer would be liable. Id. (emphasis
added). This dicta, insofar as it suggests that the manufacturer must anticipate
collisions, is wholly at variance with the Evans rationale.
Cases which have adopted the Evans rationale are collected by jurisdiction
in Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 317 A.2d 494 (1974), vacated,
274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
49. Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness": an Untenable Doctrine,
20 CLEV. ST. L. Rev. 578, 594-95 (1971) (footnotes omitted). See also Henderson,
supra note 18 (lengthy analysis of the limits of the adjudicatory process in design-
defect cases); Holford, supra note 17, at 84-88 (concern over the complex economic
ramifications of products design liability for the manufacturer).
50. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
51. Id. at 497.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 274 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1967)..
55. 391 F.2d at 506.
56. Id. at 497. See note 139 infra.
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fit for its intended use and free from hidden dangerous defects. 57 How-
ever, the Larsen court parted company with the Evans line of cases in
its interpretation of the intended use of an automobile. The court rea-
soned that a car cannot be put to its intended use without the possibility
of an accident.58 Citing Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc.,59 the court said
that the manufacturer had to anticipate the environment in which the
product would be used. The court stated:
While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with
each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automo-
bile use will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts ...
Where the injuries or enhanced injuries are due to the manufac-
turer's failure to use reasonable care to avoid subjecting the user of
its products to an unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence
principles should be applicable. The sole function of an automobile
is not just to provide a means of transportation, it is to provide a
means of safe transportation or as safe as is reasonably possible under
the present state of the art.60
57. 391 F.2d at 501. The court traced the manufacturer's liability for negligence
in construction and design from MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916) (see text accompanying notes 9-13 supra), through Davlin v.
Henry Ford & Son, Inc., 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927) (while holding for the manu-
facturer, the court ruled that the manufacturer was under a duty to use reasonable
care in employing designs, materials and assemblies which would fairly meet any
emergency of use which is foreseeable), to Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus
Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (see text accompanying notes 19-21 supra), and
Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (negligently constructed ash-
tray blinded a passenger thrown against it when the driver made an emergency stop).
Zahn was a case involving a construction defect, as opposed to a design defect, but,
unlike the construction defect in MacPherson, the defect in Zahn did not cause the
initial emergency - the jolt - but exacerbated the plaintiff's injury upon impact
with the dashboard area of the car. Id. at 730.
58. 391 F.2d at 501-02. Indeed, the court remarked:
The manufacturer should not be heard to say that it does not intend its product
to be involved in any accident when it can easily foresee and when it knows that
the probability over the life of its product is high, that it will be involved in
some type of injury-producing accident.
Id. at 502.
59. 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962). In that case, plaintiff's child died as a result
of swallowing furniture polish manufactured by the defendant. The defendant was
found negligent in failing to warn adequately of the danger involved in ingesting the
polish, notwithstanding defendant's contention that the intended use of the product did
not include consumption, and that it did not have to anticipate consumption and warn
of the danger. Id. at 83.
The Spruill court said:
"Intended use" is but a convenient adaptation of the basic test of "reasonable
foreseeability" framed to more specifically fit the factual situations out of which
arise questions of a manufacturer's liability for negligence .... Normally a seller
or manufacturer is entitled to anticipate that the product he deals in will be used
only for the purposes for which it is manufactured and sold; thus he is expected
to reasonably foresee only injuries arising in the course of such use.
However, he must also be expected to anticipate the environment which is
normal for the use of his product and where, as here, the environment is the
home, he must anticipate the reasonably foreseeable risks of the use of his product
in such environment . . . . and . . . warn [the consumer] of them . ...
Id. at 83-84.
60. 391 F.2d at 502 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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The court did not place the manufacturer in the position of an insurer,
but held only that the manufacturer had a duty of reasonable care con-
sonant with the state of the art to minimize the effect of accidents; that
is, the manufacturer was liable only for unreasonable risks of foreseeable
injury, created by its design, which would arise in the event of a collision.0 '
Further, the manufacturer was liable not for the entire damages, but only
for that portion attributable to the defective design.
62
Additionally, because the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for
negligent design, he also had a cause of action for the manufacturer's
failure to warn the consumer that the design of the ;'ehicle was defective.
The court found, however, that when the danger was obvious and known
to the user, no warning was necessary, and no liability attached for injury
occurring from the "reasonable hazards" related to the use of the product ;63
but where the dangerous condition was latent, nondisclosure subjected the
manufacturer and supplier to liability for creating an unreasonable risk.
64
The court found it unnecessary to discuss possible liability for breach
of implied warranty or strict liability for defective design65 and rejected
the manufacturer's contention that any duty regarding safety in design
should be imposed by the legislature or regulatory agency, 66 as envisioned
in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.67 The Larsen
court read the Act as supplemental to the common law of negligence and
product liability.6 8
Unlike Evans, Larsen elicited much scholarly praise, but, initially, little
judicial acceptance. 69 In Mickle v. Blackmon,70 the plaintiff was thrown
61. Id. at 502-03. The court continued:
The duty of reasonable care in design should be viewed in light of the risk,
While all iisks cannot be eliminated nor can a crash-proof vehicle be designed
under the present state of the art, there are many common-sense factors in
design, which are or should be well known to the manufacturer that will minimize
or lessen the injurious effects of a collision. The standard of reasonable care
is applied in many other negligence situations and should be applied here.
Id. at 503.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 505.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 506.
66. Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1970). The Act authorizes the Secretary of
Transportation, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, to
promulgate safety standards; however, compliance with these standards will not im-
munize the manufacturer from potential common law liability. Id. § 1397(c). See
notes 173-74 infra.
68. 391 F2d at 506.
69. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 17; Sklaw, supra note 7; Note, Badorek v.
General Motors Corporation: Strict Liability for Enhanced Injuries Caused by
Unreasonable Defective Design, 16 S. DAK. L. REv. 504 (1971) ; Comment, supra
note 17; Comment, Auto Design: Manufacturer's Duty to Reasonably Protect Occu-
pants Against the Effects of Collisions, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 396 (1969) ; Comment,
The Liability of an Automobile Manufacturer for Failure to Design a Crashworthy
Vehicle, 10 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 38 (1973). See also 35 A.T.L.A.L.J. 116 (1974)
24 VAND. L. REv. 862 (1971).
70. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
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against the gearshift lever of the car in which she was a passenger, when
the automobile was involved in a collision. The impact of the plaintiff
shattered the protective knob affixed to the end of the gearshift lever, and
consequently, she was impaled on the lever and permanently paralyzed. 71
The knob had shattered because exposure to sunlight over the years had
caused the deterioration of the material of which the knob was composed.
Had the material been colored black by the addition of carbon, the knob
would not have deteriorated.7 2 The Supreme Court of South Carolina
adopted the rationale of Larsen:
[A] n automobile manufacturer knows with certainty that many users
of his product will be involved in collisions, and that the incidence
and extent of injury to them will frequently be determined by the
placement, design and construction of such interior components as
shifts, levers, knobs, handles and others. By ordinary negligence
standards, a known risk of harm raises a duty of commensurate care.
We perceive no reason in logic or law why an automobile manufac-
turer should be exempt from this duty.73
The court, quoting Spruill7l as to the intended use of a product, concluded
that implicit in the jury verdict for the plaintiff was a finding that the
gearshift lever was not adequately guarded and therefore presented an un-
reasonable risk of injury.75
In Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,76 plaintiff was a passenger in a
Buick two-door hardtop which overturned. The roof collapsed on the
occupants because it was not strong enough to support the weight of the
overturned car. 77 Plaintiff charged negligence in design and manufacture,
breach of express and implied warranties of fitness, strict liability, and
conscious or negligent misrepresentation. 78 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, applying Pennsylvania law,
quickly disposed of plaintiff's warranty and misrepresentation arguments7 9
and treated the negligence and strict liability arguments together. After
recounting the Evans and Larsen positions, the court observed that Penn-
sylvania had adopted the rule of sections 395 and 398 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 0 as well as the rule of Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railway Co."' "that the scope of the duty is coterminus with the foresee-
ability of risk. ' ' 82 Moreover, the court discerned in recent Pennsylvania
cases "a continuing trend toward the broadening of the scope of the duty
71. Id. at 217, 166 S.E.2d at 178.
72. Id. at 235, 166 S.E.2d at 188.
73. Id. at 230, 166 S.E.2d at 185.
74. See note 59 supra.
75. 252 S.C. at 236, 166 S.E.2d at 188.
76. 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
77. Id. at 1065.
78. Id. at 1066.
79. Id. at 1066-67.
80. See notes 22 & 23 supra.
81. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
82. 298 F. Supp. at 1069.
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of care,"83 and a liberal construction of the principles of strict liability
set forth in section 402A of the Restatement. 4 Consequently, Judge
Fullam, reasoning that a Pennsylvania court would adopt Larsen, stated
the "correct rule" to be that: 1) either car accidents are a readily fore-
seeable misuse of the product,8 5 or 2) car accidents are incidental to the
normal and intended use of motor vehicles.80 Thus, passengers must be
provided a "reasonably safe container" in which to ride and the roof, as
part of that container, "should provide more than merely protection against
rain."8' 7 However, in determining whether the design was defective, that
is, created unreasonable risks or was unreasonably dangerous, the court
appeared to defer to industry custom as the standard against which to
measure the manufacturer's duty and breach.
88
More recently, New York adopted Larsen in Bolm v. Triumph
Corp.,8 9 although not without qualification. In B dlm, plaintiff was riding
a motorcycle when it collided with an automobile. A metal luggage rack
was positioned on top of the motorcycle's gas tank, immediately in front
of the saddle; when plaintiff was propelled forward by the impact, he was
torn by the rack and sustained pelvic and genital injuries resulting in
sterility.90 Plaintiff contended that the motorcycle manufacturer was liable
83. Id. at 1070. For example, in Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa.
199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a private citizen
whose building was destroyed by fire could bring suit against the water company
which was allegedly negligent in maintaining the water works, resulting in insuffi-
cient water pressure to extinguish the blaze. Judge (later Justice) Cardozo had
earlier reached a contrary result. H.R. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247
N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
84. 298 F. Supp. at 1070. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
85. 298 F. Supp. at 1073. For examples of foreseeable misuse, see Spruill v.
Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co.,
109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971).
86. 298 F. Supp. at 1073.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1073-74. The court concluded that:
in the present case, the manufacturer was not necessarily under an obligation to
provide a hardtop model which would be as resistant to roll-over damage as a
four-door sedan; but the defendant was required, in my view, to provide a
hardtop automobile which was a reasonably safe version of such model, and which
was not substantially less safe than other hardtop models.
Id. (citations omitted).
89. 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
90. Id. at 154, 305 N.E.2d at 770, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
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in negligence for the design of the motorcycle which enhanced his injuries,
strict liability for a defective product, and breach of warrantyY1 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's denial of the manu-
facturer's motion for summary judgment. 92 The Bolm court's opting for
the Larsen analysis was surprising, since the New York Court of Appeals
had earlier taken the position in Campo v. Scofield93 that a manufacturer
is under no duty to make his product accident-proof or foolproof, or to
provide safeguards against the product's obvious hazards. In fact, Campo
had been cited by Evans and its progeny as authority for the proposition
that a manufacturer is under no duty to produce a crashworthy vehicle.
Nevertheless, the Bolm court did not deem Campo dispositive of the case
in favor of the manufacturer.
94
Indeed, the court of appeals considered Evans properly refuted by
Larsen, Dyson, and other decisions. The court stated that the manu-
facturer was liable for injuries which were exacerbated by a defective
design when the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen that the
design feature would cause injury upon impact, and when the design defect
was latent.9 5
Larsen, as refined in Bolm, was embraced by the Maryland Court
of Appeals in Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young,9 6 in which the auto
of the plaintiff's decedent was struck from behind by another vehicle.
Plaintiff alleged that the decedent's injuries were caused by the design of
the seat assembly and the passenger compartment structures, surfaces,
and protrusions.9 7 The court concluded that an automobile manufacturer
is liable in negligence "for a defect in design which the manufacturer could
91. Id.
92. Id. at 160, 305 N.E.2d at 774, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 651. The Appellate Division
opinion is reported at 41 App. Div. 2d 54, 341 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1973).
93. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
94. 33 N.Y.2d at 156, 305 N.E.2d at 772, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 648. Although the Bolm
court did not deem Campo to be inconsistent with the Larsen rationale, a lower New
York court, in Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53, motion for
leave to appeal denied, 29 N.Y.2d 483, 274 N.E.2d 312, 324 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1971),
had, on the basis of Campo and its application in the Evans line of cases, denied
relief to a plaintiff who had alleged the defective design of a gas cap on a Volkswagen.
When the Volkswagen was involved in a collision, the cap flew off, the gas ignited,
and the occupant was fatally burned. The Edgar court concluded that a design defect
which had not caused the accident but merely had aggravated or enhanced the injuries
was not actionable. 37 App. Div. 2d at 88, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 55. However, the court
of appeals overruled this analysis, stating:
In citing Campo for such a broad proposition, the Edgar court necessarily rested
on one of two alternative rationales: either it considered the danger of all
"second collision" injuries to be patent or obvious, no matter what the cause; or
it considered the very involvement in a collision to be outside the "intended use"
of the vehicle so that the injuries resulting therefrom - "second collision"
injuries - are not due to a breach of duty. While the latter alternative finds
some support in other jurisdictions, we find neither rationale tenable.
33 N.Y.2d at 157, 305 N.E.2d at 772, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 649 (citations omitted).
95. Id. Thus, even after Bolm, the latent-patent danger rule of Campo retains
vitality. See text accompanying notes 158-60 infra.
96. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
97. Id. at 204, 321 A.2d at 739.
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have reasonably foreseen would cause or enhance injuries on impact,
which is not patent or obvious to the user, and which in fact leads to or
enhances the injuries in an automobile collision."98 The court was es-
pecially careful to outline the following factors relevant to a finding of
"reasonable" care in design to avoid "unreasonable" risks: the likelihood
of harm and the possible gravity of harm balanced against the burden of
precautions necessary to avoid the harm ;99 the style and type of vehicle;
its particular purpose and price; and finally, the nature of the accident.' 00
Thus, the Maryland court concluded that, in order to impose liability, the
design must be unreasonable in light of all relevant considerations and the
danger inherent in the design must be latent. 10 '
In Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 10 2 a strict liability action, 0 3 the First
Circuit concluded that Rhode Island, the forum state, would adopt
Larsen..0 4 Plaintiff's son had been killed when the Maverick in which
he was a passenger was struck from behind and exploded. 10 5 Rejecting
Evans, the First Circuit stated:
A literal Evans-type interpretation of "intended use" fails to recog-
nize that the phrase was first employed in early products-liability
cases such as Greenman [Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963)]
merely to illustrate the broader central doctrine of foreseeability. The
phrase was not meant to preclude manufacturer responsibility for the
probable ancillary consequences of normal use.10 6
98. Id. at 216, 321 A.2d at 745 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 219, 321 A.2d at 746. This is essentially the negligence formula pro-
pounded by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169
(2d Cir. 1947) and Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other
grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941).
100. 272 Md. at 219, 321 A.2d at 746. For another case adopting Larsen in which
the reasonableness of the particular design was determined in light of many factors,
see Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
101. 272 Md. at 219, 321 A.2d at 747, citing 391 F.2d at 505. However, the dis-
cussion in Larsen on latent design defect related to the manufacturer's liability for
negligent failure to warn of a dangerous condition, which cause of action was in
addition to the maufacturer's liability for negligent design of the vehicle. 391 F.2d
at 505.
102. 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
103. See note 84 supra.
104. 494 F.2d at 181. The First Circuit was applying Rhode Island law. Although
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island had not expressly adopted the reasoning of Larsen,
the First Circuit based its conclusion on that state supreme court's expansive con-
struction of the "intended use" concept in Ritter v. Naragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I.
176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971). 494 F.2d at 180-81. In Ritter, a four-year-old child was
standing on an open oven door to see into a pot on the top of the range, when the
range fell over upon her and her sister. 109 R.I. at 179, 283 A.2d at 257. The Ritter
court concluded that a jury could find that the manufacturer knew, that as a conse-
quence of the range's design, the danger in the use of the oven door as a shelf was
foreseeable; hence, the manufacturer had been negligent in not warning of the con-
sequences of such use of the oven door. Id. at 185, 283 A.2d at 260.
105. 494 F.2d at 176.
106. Id. at 181 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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However, in adopting Larsen, the court appeared to confuse the defense
of assumption of risk, the latent-patent defect rule of Campo, Bolm, and
Young, and the requirement of proximate causation when it concluded
that, "where a design defect is apparent or made known to the automobile
purchaser, an action alleging such defect as the cause of injury cannot lie."'10 7
In Perez v. Ford Motor Co.,'08 plaintiff's truck was struck from
behind; the cab disengaged from the frame, steering control was lost, and
serious injury resulted.' 0 9 The Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law,
ignored both the policy arguments in the Evans line of cases and the
extensive analysis of the scope of the manufacturer's duty in the Larsen
line of cases. Rather, in its discussion of the strict liability requirement of
an unreasonably dangerous defect, the court focused on the "normal use"
of a product." 0 As long as the vehicle was being normally used on the
highway at the time of the accident, the "normal use" requirement found
in Louisiana products liability jurisprudence was met, notwithstanding
the accident."' The accident was neither an unintended use of the vehicle
nor foreseeable misuse of the product as discussed in Evans and Dyson,
but an interruption of normal use. "The fact that it was involved in an
accident . . . does not legally preclude a claim predicated on defects in
design or manufacture."" 2 Whether the design was unreasonably dan-
gerous under the circumstances of the accident was for the trier of fact
to determine."n
107. Id. at 183, citing Burkhard v. Short, 28 Ohio App. 2d 141, 148, 275 N.E.2d
632, 636-37 (1971). In Burkhard, the court held that an unpadded dashboard was not
an unreasonably dangerous defect within the meaning of section 402A of the
Restatement. Id. at 147-48, 275 N.E.2d at 637. The result in Burkhard was not based
upon assumption of risk, although it can be reasoned that a person must have been
aware of the fact of the unpadded dashboard, and hence have assumed the risks in-
herent in it. Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and
proved by the defendant, whereas the latency of the allegedly dangerous condition
of the product must be alleged - or at least proved - by the plaintiff, in those
jurisdictions requiring that the defect or dangerous condition be latent. E.g., Campo
v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) ; see note 31 supra and text accom-
panying notes 157-60 infra. See also Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile, 9
FORUM 1, 11 (1973). On the other hand, the plaintiff's voluntary assumption of the
risk of the patent danger, or his negligence in not becoming aware of the patent con-
dition, might be deemed the "proximate cause" of the injury, rather than the defect
itself. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, §§ 41-45, at 236-90; Noel, Defective
Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND.
L. REv. 93 (1972). The Turcotte court was apparently talking about voluntary
assumption of known risks by the purchaser, which would not dispose of the manu-
facturer's liability for injuries to other users. 494 F.2d at 183 & n.13.
108. 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974).
109. Id. at 84.
110. Id. at 85.
111. Id. at 87.
112. Id.
113. Id. The court concluded:
We are not saying that an automobile manufacturer has a duty to produce
a vehicle which provides absolute safety for passengers under any and all
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Most recently, Larsen has been adopted by Texas in Turner v.
General Motors Corp.," 4 a strict liability action in which the plaintiff
charged defective design of the roof of his Chevrolet. In an accident, the
plaintiff's car overturned, collapsing the roof on the plaintiff. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff's hands and legs were paralzyed." 5  The Turner
court noted that the "environment" definition of intended use announced
in Spruill"6 had recently been approved by the Texas Supreme Court.
n
7
Thus, since Larsen was based on Spruill, the court found the Larsen
reasoning compelling." 8 Additionally, the Turner court acknowledged
that the reasonableness of the design depended on many factors. 119 More-
over, the court effectively disposed of the manufacturer's contention that
automobile design standards are a legislative function, beyond a judge and
jury's competence. 120 Finally, the court reached the defendant's ultimate
contention that its roof design was comparable to that of all mass-produced
vehicles in the United States and therefore could not be "unreasonably"
dangerous as a matter of law.121 Although there was a suggestion in
Dyson that the manufacturer satisfied his duty of reasonable design if the
vehicle were not substantially less safe than other hardtop models, 122 the
Turner court noted that the entire industry might be indicted for defective
conditions. We are saying that plaintiff Perez should have the opportunity to
present his evidence to a jury to prove that his Ford pickup truck was unrea-
sonably dangerous when involved in a rear-end collision at a thirty miles an
hour speed differential. No reasonable person would expect a truck to sustain
such an accident without the slightest dent or injury to its passengers. But the
question is whether what happened in the collision should have happened. We
believe that reasonable men could differ as to whether or not the design, manu-
facture, or construction of the Perez truck was unreasonably dangerous tinder
these circumstances.
Id. The Perez approach is not ingenius, but merely an affirmation, from a slightly
different vantage point, of the principles underlying Larsen.
114. 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). The opinion is especially significant
because previously it had been assumed by the federal district court in Willis v.
Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (S.D. Tex. 1967), that Evans was the law
of Texas.
115. 514 S.W.2d at 499.
116. See note 59 supra.
117. Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968).
118. 514 S.W.2d at 504.
119. Id. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
120. Id. at 506. The court stated that:
we are not aware that the argument of the necessity of federal regulation has
been made in regard to design defects which cause accidents, and we cannot see
any reason why design defects which cause injuries are any more in need of
federal control. The danger that juries will arrive at conflicting conclusions is a
hazard every manufacturer who distributes nationally runs. The complex,
technical questions facing juries, aided by expert testimony, cannot be more
difficult than the questions in such fields as medical malpractice.
Id.
121. Id.
122. 298 F. Supp. at 1073-74. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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design of automobile roofs.' 28 Clearly, Turner represents the most aggres-
sive application of the Larsen rationale thus reported.
1 2 4
Thus, the Larsen line of cases proceeds from an expanded notion of a
product's intended use and the manufacturer's duty of reasonable care in
the design of his product given the environment of its use. In those cases,
it is evident that the courts consider themselves proper forums, supple-
mental to legislative bodies, in which to impose liability for injury-
causing designs.'
25
IV. THEORIES OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURER LIABILITY:
NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, WARRANTY
But what is the nature of this liability? The principle theories of
recovery are negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. The manu-
facturer's negligence can be threefold: negligent design, i.e., the design
creates unreasonable risks of injury to users in its normal or intended use;
negligence in failing to adequately inspect and test the car to discover and
eliminate dangerous design features; and negligent failure to warn of the
design hazards. Strict liability is based on either the rule of section 402A
of the Restatement,12 the design presents a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer, or on the rule of Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 12 7 the design is defective and renders the
product unsafe for its intended use.' 28 The warranty theory is generally
framed in terms of breach of express warranty or implied warranty of
merchantability. 12 The question becomes, of course, whether it matters
123. 514 S.W.2d at 506-07. The court stated that "the expert's condemnation of
the industry for its failure to install roll bars constitutes a sufficient showing that the
custom itself was unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 507. See generally James & Siger-
son, supra note 17, at 709; Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147
(1942). The Turner court's approach recalls Mr. Justice Holmes' famous words:
"What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought
to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it is usually com-
plied with or not." Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903). See also
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (a "whole calling" may be negli-
gent in having unduly lagged in the adoption of new, available devices).
124. Other decisions embracing Larsen include Passwaters v. General Motors
Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Grundmanis v. British Motors Corp., 308 F.
Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970) ; Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d
1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) ; Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d
902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970) ; Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763,
165 S.E.2d 734, cert. dismissed, 225 Ga. 290, 167 S.E.2d 926 (1969); Engberg v.
Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973).
125. See text accompanying notes 170-74 infra.
126. For text of this section, see note 84 supra.
127. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
128. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. For a comparison of the
Greenman and Restatement approaches to strict liability, see Clary v. Fifth Ave.
Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 247 (Alaska 1969) ; Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 131-34, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 440-42 (1972).
129. In this regard, section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample-
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
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that the plaintiff proceeds on a negligence, strict liability, or warranty
theory. It is submitted that, with the possible exception of a warranty
action, the theory of the action does not affect the plaintiff's burden of proof,
the manufacturer's defenses, or the outcome of the action.
The warranty theory is the least satisfactory approach in automobile
design cases, and the majority of the cases in both the Evans and Larsen
lines either do not reach the warranty issue'80 or summarily dispose of it.131
A warranty action is unsatisfactory for a plaintiff for a variety of reasons:
1) the manufacturer never expressly warrants his automobile to be rea-
sonably safe in a collision ;182 2) any implied warranties of either mer-
bargain creates an express warranty that-the goods shall conform
to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is, made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall con-
form to the sample or -model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods:does not create a warranty.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313.
Section 2-314 provides:
Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316),.a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind ...
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least as such as:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted'by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) ate adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the con-
tainer or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Id. § 2-314.
130. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968);
Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
131. E.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966);
McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17, 20 (S.D. W.Va. 1971); Dyson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (E.D. Pa. 1969) ; Shumard v. General
Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311, 314 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
132. For an analysis of the scope and effectiveness of new car warranties, see
R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 1168-77
(2d ed. 1974) ; Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the
Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wisc. L. REV. 1006.
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chantability or fitness for a particular purpose are generally excluded or
modified ;18 3) the existence of privity requirements8 4 and notice re-
133. Section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code specifically allows such ex-
clusions:
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties-
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the
provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202)
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention mer-
chantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to ex-
clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be
by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied war-
ranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's atten-
tion to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is
no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has
refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with
regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances
have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course
of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the
provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on
contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
Of course, under section 2-302 and cases such as Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), disclaimers may be void as against
public policy. See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757
(1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) ; Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITr.
L. REV. 1 (1969).
134. Consider, for example, the difficulties encountered by the plaintiff in main-
taining a warranty action in Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1066
(E.D. Pa. 1969), and in LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 376 (W.D. Pa.
1967), due to a lack of horizontal privity. In the leading early case of Baxter v. Ford
Motor Corp., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), the court eliminated the require-
ment of vertical privity in an action for breach of express warranty. The court
reasoned:
It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit manufacturers of goods
to create a demand for their products by representing that they possess qualities
which they, in fact, do not possess, and then, because there is no privity of con-
tract existing between the consumer and the manufacturer, deny the consumer
the right to recover if damages result from the absence of those qualities, when
such absence is not readily noticeable.
Id. at 462-63, 12 P.2d at 412.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, third party beneficiaries of express
and implied warranties are dealt with in three alternative sections. UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (1972). See generally Weaver, Allocation of Risks in Products
Liability Cases: The Need for a Revised Third Party Beneficiary Theory in UCC
Warranty Actions, 52 VA. L. REV. 1028 (1966) ; Note, supra note 13, at 456-57.
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quirements ;135 and 4) the difficulty in convincing a court that an uncrash-
worthy car is in fact unmerchantable.
136
Conversely, negligence and strict liability are equally satisfactory
theories of liability, but are essentially indistinguishable when applied to
the crashworthy issue. If the plaintiff proceeds on a negligent design
theory, he must establish that the manufacturer owed a duty of care in
design so that the vehicle was reasonably safe for intended use, given the
broader notion of intended use developed in the Larsen line of cases; that
the manufacturer breached that duty because the design in fact was not
reasonably safe; that plaintiff was injured; and the injury was proximately
caused by the manufacturer's breach of duty.' 37 Under strict liability, the
plaintiff must establish a defective design which was unreasonably dan-
gerous, 138 and was responsible for plaintiff's injuries. When the plaintiff
establishes an unreasonably dangerous design and injury, he establishes
at the same time strict liability and, for purposes of negligence, a breach
of duty. The identity of these theories is recognized by commentators and
courts alike,'89 although one commentator has argued in favor of the strict
liability theory because decisions based on strict liability
represent an attempt to shed the encrusted history of the law of negli-
gence by invoking a separate vocabulary which is more specifically
135. Section 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides in part:
"Where a tender has been accepted (a) the buyer must within a reasonable time
after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach
or be barred from any remedy . . . ." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a).
In Greenman, Justice Traynor focused on the requirement of notice for breach of
warranty under the Uniform Sales Act which was essentially the same as section
2-607(3) of the UCC and rejected the requirement where the plaintiff suing for
breach of warranty was not in privity with the remote seller. 59 Cal. 2d at 61-62,
377 P.2d at 899-901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699-701. It has been observed recently that a court
may be less inclined in a consumer-personal injury case to rigorously apply the Code's
warranty and notice provisions. R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WIIITe, supra note
132, at 1150.
136. Note, supra note 13, at 457.
137. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 30, at 143. See also Rheingold, Proof of Defect
in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325, 325-27 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Rheingold, Proof].
138. However, a recent California case dispenses with the requirement of "unrea-
sonable danger," instead focusing only upon the defect and injury. Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.. Rptr. 433 (1972). While this
approach may be satisfactory in cases of manufacturing defects, the case in Cronin,
when the issue involves a design defect, "defect" can only be measured in terms of
"unreasonableness" of the danger created by the design. See Keeton, Product Liability
and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973).
139. See, e.g., Rheingold, Proof, supra note 137, at 325-26, in which the author
asserted that a defect for strict liability purposes is a defect for negligence and war-
ranty purposes, and that there is little practical difference in the legal bases for
recovery - at least as far as the trier of fact is concerned. Professor Sklaw has
explained that proof of negligence is built into proof of the defect for strict liability
purposes. Stated differently, the finding of a defect is dependent upon a showing of
a deviation from required due care, i.e., negligence. Thus, as proof of negligence
rests on a showing of failure of the manufacturer to act reasonably, proof of strict
liability in second collisions actually carries the same requirement as to the defect.
Sklaw, supra note 7, at 522-23. Dean Wade has remarked that the proof necessary
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pointed and thus, hopefully, more effective in dealing with a still
evolving legal situation. Further, even if the ultimate meaning of
this new set of words is the same as the old, their effect is not. The
distinction already noted between the effect of an instruction phrased
in the language of warranty and that of strict liability in tort is
equally applicable when comparing strict liability with negligence.
In either case, strict liability language is plaintiff-oriented.
140
V. "DESIGN DEFECT"
A. Meaning and Existence
While the various theories upon which the plaintiff's action proceeds
are easily conceptualized, the idea of the "design defect" is not so easily
grasped. In many of the opinions, a defect is assumed for purposes of the
opinion, so that there is no attempt to define the term.141 While it is not
difficult to conceive of a manufacturing defect, as in MacPherson, where
one wheel was substandard compared to all other wheels produced by the
same manufacturer, the notion of the design defect at first appears to be a
contradiction in terms since the product strictly conforms to the model
design. Therefore, the defect, under any theory of liability, inheres in the
design's injury-producing capacity.
to establish strict liability.will certainly be sufficient to establish negligence liability
as well. "There are thus inmate similarities between the actions in negligence and in
strict liability, and changing the terminology does not alter this." Wade, supra note 5,
at 837. See also 24 VAND. L. REv. 862, 866 n.37 (1971). Dean Prosser has noted,
however, that "[s]ince proper design is a matter of reasonable fitness, the strict
liability adds little or nothing to negligence on the part of the manufacturer; but it
becomes more important in the case of a dealer who does not design the product."
W. PROSSnR, supra note 12, § 99, at 659 n.72.
Likewise, the Dyson court reasoned:
In determining the possible liability of the defendant under general negligence
principles, and under the strict-liability concepts of section 402A of the Restate-
ment of Torts, 2d, the accurate formulation of the issues may differ, but the
essence of the issues is identical. In the exercise of due care (or, to avoid
creating an "unreasonably dangerous" product) should the defendant have de-
signed the roof of its 1965 Buick Electra hardtop so that it would support the
weight of an automobile, when, after a 180 roll-over, the vehicle came to rest
on its roof?
298 F. Supp. at 1067.
The Walton court also presented a case in which the strict liability and
negligence principles blend. In that case, the court proceeded under section 402A
strict liability, assumed a defect and injury, but did not impose liability because there
was no duty owed by the manufacturer with regard to the defect; hence the defect
was not actionable. 229 So. 2d at 573. While the opinion demonstrated the identity of
negligence and strict liability in cases of design defects, the problem with the court's
reasoning is that, if the manufacturer owed no duty to make the car "crashworthy,"
then there was no "defect" in design upon which the plaintiff could proceed under
strict liability. Yet the court illogically conceded the existence of a defect ! See
id. at 570.
140. Sklaw, supra note 7, at 523-24 (footnotes omitted).
141. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968)
Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 908, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970);
Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
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Under a traditional negligence analysis, whether the design is defec-
tive depends first upon the existence of an apparent risk - a recognizable
danger. 142 The Evans and Larsen lines of cases both acknowledge that
automobile collisions are foreseeable - indeed inevitable. It takes little
imagination to conceive the consequences to the occupants of a vehicle upon
impact: their bodies strike the interior, while the car itself explodes, breaks
apart, or collapses upon the occupants. Because the collision and resulting
injuries are recognizable and foreseeable, a design is defective if the injury-
producing feature presents a foreseeable, appreciable risk which could have
been averted by a different design without substantially affecting the utility,
price, and attractiveness of the product. In the Evans case, for example,
the perimeter frame would have afforded the occupant of the car greater
protection in the event of a broadside collision, a recognizable danger. The
manufacturer could have guarded against that risk by use of the perimeter
frame, rather than the "X" frame, apparently at an insubstantial extra
cost.' 48 The design would be found defective if the factfinder determined
that the manufacturer's choice of "X" frame, in the face of the recognizable,
appreciable risk of broadside collisions, was unreasonable. This analysis is
essentially identical to that employed by Judge Learned Hand in a negli-
gence case to ascertain whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable:
namely, was the burden on the defendant to take adequate precautions in
the face of the recognized danger less than the probability that the injury-
producing event would occur, multiplied by the gravity of the injury which
would result if the event occurred.144 This balancing formula also applies
in a strict liability analysis of defect. Indeed, one writer has asserted that
the manufacturer, in deciding upon a design, should employ an economic
analysis parallel to the factfinder's balancing analysis described by Learned
Hand, so that, "under strict liability the manufacturer must attempt to
quantify and balance those factors that Judge Hand thought best left
to a jury"' 45 in a negligence action.
Section 402A of the Restatement and cases decided under warranty
and strict liability theories suggest two additional approaches which may
be utilized to ascertain whether the design is in fact defective. In the
first approach, the inquiry focuses on whether the safeness of the product
conforms to the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer. 14 A
comment to section 402A of the Restatement states that liability attaches
only when the product is in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
142. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 31, at 145-46.
143. 359 F.2d at 824. The plaintiff in Evans was prepared to prove at trial that,
since 1961, the defendant had improved the design of many of its models, by -nak-
ing them with side rails, to give the added protection inherent in perimeter frame
vehicles. Id.
144. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
145. Holford, supra note 17, at 87 n.21 (citations omitted).
146. For an excellent case defining "defect" in terms of consumer expectations,
see Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
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consumer, and which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. 147 This
approach suggests that, even if the design might be defective under a
balancing test because the risk might reasonably have been obviated, the
design is not defective if the consumer contemplated or expected the con-
dition. However, while defining a defect in terms of the consumer's ex-
pectations would seem appropriate in a contract action, it makes little
sense in a tort action. As Dean Wade has insisted:
In the absence of authorities on strict liability, early commentators
resorted to cases based on warranty liability - whether expressed or
implied. They thus used contract language. How good did the
product have to be? What were the expectations of the parties? Are
these actual expectations or reasonable ones? What might the manu-
facturer expect the consumer to expect? This is all warranty lan-
guage. It essentially is a contract approach. It sounds as if the action
is based on the ground that the buyer did not receive what he con-
tracted for, so that he is entitled either to return it and get his money
back or to keep it and sue for the difference between the value in its
actual condition and the value it would have had if it had complied
with his reasonable expectations. True, if the product caused injury,
recovery might be had to compensate for it. But these are consequen-
tial damages, coming almost as an afterthought. Their availability
may depend on the rules of Hadley v. Baxendale, rather than those
of proximate cause in tort. Under the warranty approach, there is
no available basis for liability other than that for purchasers who
might have had "expectations" from the manufacturer or supplier.
148
The second, rather satisfactory approach to ascertaining the meaning
and existence of a design defect under a strict liability theory was set
forth by a federal district court in LaGorga v. Kroger Co.,' 49 where the
plaintiff-child was critically burned when the jacket he was wearing was
exposed to an open fire and exploded into flames. In analyzing the facts,
the court reasoned that the jacket had been defective if the intended design
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965).
148. Wade, supra note 5, at 833-34 (footnotes omitted). Dean Wade further
argued that a major difficulty in defining a defect in terms of consumer expectations
is that
it is likely to limit the requirement of safety to what is customary within the
trade, on the basis that this is what the customer has come to expect. But the
law should be that what is normally done by manufacturers, and therefore ex-
pected, while it may be adequate, is still not the standard. The "state of the art"
is not controlling.
Id. at 834 n.30 (citations omitted). Dean Keeton is also critical of defining "defect"
in terms of consumer expectations. Keeton, supra note 107, at 8.
However, one author has contended that "defect" under strict liability is best
defined in terms of the consumer's expectations. He reasoned that since it is the
consumer's action, and since it is he or she who is being protected by the law, the
consumer's reasonable expectatons should determine the standard to which the sup-
plier is obligated to conform. Rheingold, Expectations, supra note 5, at 592-93.
Yet even this author, at one point, appears to have subscribed to a negligence-type
balancing test in order to ascertain "unreasonable dangerousness" or "defect." Id.
at 595.
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had made the product unreasonably dangerous or not reasonably safe;
thus, an unreasonably dangerous product became synonymous with a defec-
tive condition.'5 0 The design had to be safe for ordinary foreseeable cir-
cumstances, which in this case was open fires. 15' But it should be noted
that the unreasonable danger or defective condition was determined by
application of the balancing analysis employed in negligence law: the issues
were whether the jacket could have been made safe for wear by fireproofing
and whether an alternate design was feasible, practical, inexpensive and
effective.' 52 Therefore, as a practical matter, this approach to strict liability
differs little from that under a traditional negligence theory.' 53
Perhaps liability should not be based upon the concept of "defective
design" but rather upon whether the product is safe in light of a number
of factors. 1 54 If the product is deemed unsafe, knowledge of this dangerous
condition is imputed to the manufacturer as a matter of law. The inquiry
thus becomes whether, given this notice, the manufacturer was negligent
in selling the product; i.e., whether the magnitude of the risk created by
150. Id. at 380.
151. Id. at 379.
152. Id. at 380-81. Indeed, the court remarked: "If the manufacturer could
provide a safeguard which would make the jacket substantially safer for children to
wear without prohibitive cost, marketing the product without such safeguard would
seem unjustified." Id. at 381 n.17, citing Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,
19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17-18 & n.4 (1965).
153. Moreover, the LaGorga court rejected the argument that the product could
not be defective if generic with other jackets of the same composition and design. 275
F. Supp. at 379. It has been suggested by some that a product cannot be defective
under any theory of liability if the product matches the average quality of similar
products, that is, is designed as is customary in the trade. See Dyson v. General
Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073-74 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367
(1965). However, this mode of analysis is untenable and has been rejected by courts
in negligence actions (see note 123 supra), strict liability actions, as in LaGorga and
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), and by the
commentators, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 33, at 166-67; Morris, supra note
123; Nader & Page, supra note 17, at 650.
154. Dean Wade has suggested seven factors which might be relevant in ascer-
taining whether the product is duly safe:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause in-
jury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need
and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of
the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product
and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious
condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 5, at 837-38 (footnotes omitted).
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the dangerous condition of the product was outweighed by the social
utility attained by marketing the product in this condition.' 5 Dean Wade
insisted that this approach is not an abandonment of the strict liability
concept. 156 Other commentators would limit the application of the term
"defect" to miscarriages in the manufacturing process and replace the
term "design defect" with "design deficiency," "design hazard", or "unsafe
design. 1' 5 7 These alternatives constitute improvements over the negligence
and strict liability analyses of design defect crudely developed in the Evans
and Larsen lines of cases. Ultimately however, any concept of design
defect resolves itself into the facially simple inquiry of whether the design
was reasonable under the circumstances of its use.
B. The Patent-Latent Defect Rule: The Campo Syndrome
A discussion of the meaning of defect in automobile design cases
cannot be concluded without mention of the patent-latent defect or patent-
latent danger rule' 58 developed in Campo v. Scofield'5O and adopted in
a "sub-line" of cases following Larsen.10 0 The rule of Campo is that the
155. Id. at 834-35. Professor Keeton also proposed a risk-benefit analysis in
passing upon designs:
A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed. It is un-
reasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of
the scientifically perceivable danger as it proved to be at the time of trial out-
weighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed.
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38
(1973) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Compare Calabresi & Hirschoff,
Toward a Test For Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972), where the
authors suggested an alternative test for liability that does not require the court to
employ a cost-benefit analysis; rather, the court decides, as between the parties to the
accident, which one is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between
accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made.
156. Wade, supra note 5, at 135.
157. Nader & Page, supra note 17, at 650 & n.38, where the authors remarked that
the normal definition of "defect" must be strained to include mistakes on the draw-
ing board.
158. One writer distinguished between patent-latent defect and patent-latent
danger, suggesting that, in design cases, the latter terminology was more appropriate.
Note, supra note 13, at 447 n.24. However, the terms are often used interchangeably
by the courts. See, e.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 144, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104
Cal. Rptr. 443, 448-49 (1972).
159. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
160. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974);
Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973);
see text accompanying note 107 supra (the position of Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co.,
494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974) in this "sub-line"). Moreover, while Burkhard v. Short,
28 Ohio App. 2d 141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971) is frequently cited as a decision adopting
Evans, or a case of assumption of risk, it in fact is neither, but actually belongs to the
Bolm-Young sub-line. The Burkhard court said that "[u]nder some conceivable
circumstances a manufacturer could be held liable for injury suffered by a passenger
as a result of defective design, even though the defective design was not the proximate
cause of, or related to, the cause of the collision." Id. at 148, 275 N.E.2d at 637.
But the allegedly unsafe design feature (unpadded dashboard) was plainly visible,
entirely obvious, and together with the fact that the unpadded dashboard was a
typical feature on all automobiles, the design could not be considered unreasonably
dangerous within the terms of section 402A of the Restatement.
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manufacturer is not liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of
the product if that condition is obvious to the user.1 61 The rationale
appears to be that such patently dangerous conditions either do not present
unreasonable risks to the user, so that the manufacturer did not breach
his duty of care, or that the user, aware of the patent danger, must have
assumed the attendant risks, or that a patently dangerous condition cannot
be unreasonably dangerous and defective within strict liability. While
the Campo rule retains vitality in a number of jurisdictions, 162 it is un-
acceptable because "its use diverts attention from the fundamental ques-
tion of tort law; the reasonableness of the risk of harm to which the
manufacturer subjects those who use his product.' u6 3  Furthermore, the
rule is unsatisfactory because it "emphasizes the actions of the consumer,
rather than the negligence of the manufacturer. It is, after all, the manu-
facturer, not the consumer, who is held to a standard of expertise. It
seems reasonable for a consumer to depend upon the adequacy of the
design of the product he is using."'1 64 The fact that a dangerous design
is apparent should not give the courts pause in ascertaining whether there
is an actionable design defect. Rather, it should be left to the manufacturer
to demonstrate as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff voluntarily
assumed the risks of harm apparent in the design, 165 or, where contributory
negligence is alleged, that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to discover
or foresee the danger. 16 6 Thus, to the extent that Bolm and Young graft
the Campo rule upon Larsen,167 these cases represent a retreat from the
consumer-oriented principles of the Larsen opinion.
VI. Evans AND ITS PROGENY: JUDICIAL NONSENSE
Having recounted the various theories of manufacturer liability,
and the difficulties involved in giving content to the term "design defect" in
161. 301 N.Y. at 471-73, 95 N.E.2d at 803-04.
162. See cases cited in W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 96, at 649.
163. Katz, Negligence in Design: A Current Look, 1965 INS. L.J. 5, 8 [hereinafter
cited as Katz, Negligence]. See Goldsmith v. Martin Marietta Corp., 211 F. Supp.
91, 97-98 (D. Md. 1962) (even obvious dangers that are fully appreciated may be
unreasonable); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443
(1972); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1970) ; Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
See also Nader & Page, supra note 17, at 656 ("The controlling issue in these cases
should be whether or not the risk was unreasonable, not whether it was latent
or patent").
164. Katz, Negligence, supra note 163, at 9.
165. However, as to the consumer's assumption of the risks involved in a car's
design, one commentator has written:
While there is unquestionably some element of risk involved in any form of
automobile transportation, it does not follow that the consumer has assumed the
risk of those dangers which are not inherent in the situation, but which are the
direct result of faulty design on the part of the manufacturer. The consumer
has never appreciated the relationship between car design and injury potential,
and cannot be taken to assume any risk of conditions of which he is ignorant.
Katz, Liability, supra note 14, at 872 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
166. See generally Noel, supra note 107.
167. See note 160 supra.
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terms of negligence and strict liability, it remains to expose the weaknesses
of the Evans line of cases. These opinions almost uniformly proceed by
overstating the plaintiff's case in order to refute it. In fact, the injured
consumers in these cases were not asserting that the manufacturer was an
insurer, or that the manufacturer had a duty to produce a crashproof,
accident-proof, foolproof or fireproof car. Rather, the plaintiffs simply
urged that they had sustained unnecessary injuries due to the manufac-
turer's failure to eliminate unreasonable risks of harm to the car's occu-
pants upon collision, a recognizable, appreciable and foreseeable risk. Thus,
the unreasonable risks inherent in the product's design made the product
unreasonably dangerous and therefore defective.
When one recognizes the calculated overstatement of the plaintiff's
case in the Evans decisions, it is not difficult to recognize another flaw
in these opinions - namely, the simplistic reasoning that the manufac-
turer's duty of safe design does not extend to the collision situation since
the product's intended use does not include accidents. Both the Larsen
cases and many of the commentators reject this narrow concept of intended
use and properly require manufacturers to anticipate the environment of the
product's use and the foreseeable uses, and indeed, misuses, of the product.
Some of the Evans decisions'0 8 bemoan the fact that a court could
not oversee the automobile industry; they complain that to grant the
plaintiff relief would result in a different set of design standards for each
of the fifty states. However, the plaintiffs did not request the court to
grant injunctive relief or to impose a judicially formulated set of designs
on the manufacturer but only sought legal damages. To find the manu-
facturer liable for a product design which caused injury is not to impose
a judicially created set of safety standards on the automobile industry.
It has been observed that in traditional negligence actions it is for the
factfinder to determine whether the defendant acted reasonably; a finding
of negligence
implies that there was some concrete thing that he could have done
or omitted to do, and that such act or such omitted precaution was
reasonable and feasible and would have been effective to prevent in-
jury under the circumstances .... In this sense the jury need not fix
or agree upon a standard of conduct of precautions to be taken, but
need only find that the conduct of the party falls short of any standard
which they would agree upon as reasonable. The jury's finding of
negligence is thus always that the actor should not have acted as he
did; this implies that he should have acted otherwise, but not neces-
sarily in any specific manner.169
168. See, e.g., Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568, 573 (Miss. 1969).
169. James & Sigerson, supra note 17, at 698-99 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
in original). The authors, however, went on to say that
[iut is true that plaintiff does not have the burden of showing what specific
omitted precautions would have been reasonable and would have averted harm,
and that neither court nor jury need necessarily fix upon any such precaution
before a defendant may be held negligent. Yet if upon the whole case the court
cannot see the possibility of any feasible and effective precaution which the actor
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Conversely, it has been argued that the setting of specific standards is
implicit in a court's attempt to apply general reasonableness standards in
cases involving allegedly defective products, for when the standards have
not been previously established by legislation, the courts must formulate
their own standards, and such is not a proper judicial function when the
manufacturer's conscious design choice is at issue.170 Although this re-
strictive view of the judiciary lies at the heart of the Evans line of cases,
it is not convincing. While Congress has facilitated the judicial process
by imposing minimum uniform standards of design upon the automobile
industry171 so that manufacturer noncompliance is a statutory violation
and may be negligence per se,172 it also has recognized that the courts must
supplement legislation and administrative regulations which do not ade-
quately protect the public.178 The continued importance of the courts in the
area of automobile design has also been emphasized by the commentators.
7 4
VII. CONCLUSION
Thus, it would seem that the benefits to be derived from judicial
activity in the area of automobile design outweigh any difficulties inherent
in such adjudication. Furthermore, the publicity generated by automobile
omitted . . . it will direct a verdict for the defendant. For that reason it is often
advisable for plaintiffs to prove or to suggest in argument to the court one or
more such precautions where there is danger that they will not be obvious.
Id. at 703 (footnotes omitted).
170. Henderson, supra note 17, at 1533-34; see note 17 supra.
171. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.
(1970).
172. See Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence
Actions, 28 TEXAS L. REv. 143 (1949) ; Comment, Products Liability Based Upon the
Violation of Statutory Standards, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1388 (1966).
173. See 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1970). For further evidence of the obvious legis-
lative intent that the courts continue to play an active role in automobile design suits,
see H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966) ; S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1966).
174. In insisting that a court is as well-equipped as an administrative agency to
weigh competing interests in ascertaining manufacturers' liability for product designs,
some commentators have contended:
While there is much to be said for consistency and uniformity, achieving
these ends by making the agency [the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, which administers the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1970)] the sole and ultimate arbiter of design standards
ignores the political aspect of design decisions. When the standard-setting func-
tion is centralized exclusively in a single agency, that agency becomes the sole
target for outside pressures. There is only one battle to be won. The considerable
power of the automobile industry, brought to bear on the agency, will inevitably
affect the standard-setting process. Therefore, a decentralization of the decision-
making function allows the creation of contervailing [sic] pressures which can
support or prod the agency. This is perhaps what Congress intended to be the
thrust of section 108(c) [15 U.S.C. § 1397(c)].
Nader & Page, supra note 17, at 676. Indeed, it has been suggested outright that the
Department of Transportation is the captive of the automobile industry. Comment,
supra note 17, at 305-06. Moreover, because any standards promulgated by the agency
are not retroactively applied, the courts continue to play a vital role in the area of
automobile design liability. Id.
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design suits stimulates public awareness.1 7 5 Finally, because the damage
suit is, historically, the great persuader of the socially irresponsible, 176
it may be the most effective methodj,of insuring that automobile manufac-
turers respond to the public need for safer automobiles.
Larsen and the cases which adopt its reasoning have been criticized
by courts and commentators who interpret the cases as defining the manu-
facturer's duty only in terms of foreseeability of injury.a77 However, the
rule of Larsen "is not grounded upon foreseeability, but upon the unrea-
sonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.' 178 If Professor Seavey
is correct in his view of the importance of MacPherson in focusing atten-
tion upon the risk of harm and not upon the way in which the harm
occurred or the number of acts intervening between the defendant's conduct
and the harmful event, 7 9 then the Larsen cases are not, in the final
analysis, such a remarkable development in the law spanning the half-
century from MacPherson to the present.
Frederick T. Haase, Jr.
175. Nader & Page, supra note 17, at 673.
176. Katz, Negligence, supra note 163, at 12.
177. See, e.g., Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 530, 317 A.2d
494, 501 (1974), vacated, 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975) ; Hoenig & Werber, supra
note 49, at 588.
178. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
One writer observed that, while Larsen's reasoning has been criticized by Hoenig &
Werber, among others, nevertheless, "foreseeability of risk has long been recognized
as a basic test for defining the scope of duty in negligence law." 49 TUL. L. REv. 250,
253 n.17 (1974) (citations omitted) ; Cf. Green, Foresecability in Negligence Law,
6 COLum. L. REv. 1401, 1417-19 (1961).
179. See note 13 supra.
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